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BETWEEN MIND AND MATHEMATICS. 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMPUTATIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF MUSIC 
Edoardo ACOTTO1, Moreno ANDREATTA2 
RÉSUMÉ – Entre l'esprit et les mathématiques. Sur différents types de représentations 
computationnelles de la musique 
Dans cet article nous analysons différents types de représentations de la musique, aussi bien d’un point 
de vue cognitif que computationnel. Si les représentations mentales de la musique sont l’objet de l’esprit 
musical, et donc par définition si elles constituent une question philosophique et cognitive, on peut faire 
l'hypothèse que les représentations mathématiques aussi aient des corrélats cognitifs permettant la 
compréhension de la musique non-tonale. Parmi les nombreuses typologies de représentations 
mathématiques de la musique, nous analyserons en détail quelques exemples relevant du paradigme 
transformationnel, un sous-domaine formalisé de la musicologie computationnelle provenant de la 
tradition ensembliste américaine. La démarche transformationnelle en musique ouvre aussi de nouvelles 
questions sur les ramifications cognitives et philosophiques des approches algébriques et catégorielles en 
théorie de la musique, analyse et composition. 
MOTS CLÉS – Analyse transformationnelle, Espaces conceptuels, Musique, Objet sonore, 
Représentations mentales, Structuralisme phénoménologique, Théorie générative de la musique tonale 
ABSTRACT – In this article we analyse different types of representations of music, both from a 
cognitive and a computational point of view. Whereas mental representations of music are the objects of 
the musical mind, and are therefore by definition a subject of cognitive psychology and philosophy, it can 
be argued that mathematical representations of music also have some cognitive correlates enabling the 
understanding of non-tonal music. Amongst the many typologies of mathematical representations of 
music, we will analyse in detail some examples belonging to the transformational paradigm, which is a 
formalized subfield of computational musicology coming from the American set-theoretical tradition. 
Transformational music analysis also raises new questions about the cognitive and philosophical 
ramifications of algebraic and category-theory approaches in music theory, analysis and composition. 
KEYWORDS – Conceptual spaces, Generative theory of tonal music, Mental representations, 
Music, Phenomenological structuralism, Sound object, Transformational analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Nussbaum [2007], modern western music is without any reasonable doubt 
a question of representations: “Pieces of music are not physical objects, and so have no 
single 'ground' manifestation. The question of how to represent a piece of music for 
processing by computer therefore does not have a single answer” [Marsden, 2005]. So, 
different kinds of representations are possible and probably desirable for different 
theoretical or practical aims. Despite of the relative lack of communication between 
cognitive and computational musicology and the mathematical theory of music, our aim 
is to get these disciplines to communicate together. Our perspective is pluralistic: the 
representation of music is said in many ways, and according to neural darwinism the 
representations in the brain are in competition. We think that mind/brain has the 
possibility to represent music at many levels and in different forms, as musical structure 
and musical perception are not necessarily congruent: mathematical structures of music 
could be perfectly objective but non entirely (or not at all) perceivable, as it is the case 
for Z-relations, and Tn and TnI relations [Forte 1973; Rahn 1980; Morris 1988]. The 
objectivity of musical structures and their cognitive relevance has to be approached 
through a plurality of conceptual instruments. 
2. MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS IN COGNITIVE MUSICOLOGY 
In cognitive musicology the use of the concept of mental representation is quite 
widespread but ambiguous and vague. The mainstream cognitive musicology maintains 
that mental representations of music are non-conceptual or are, in Dretske's [1995] 
taxonomy, sensory mental states (see Figure 1): 
 
FIGURE 1. Dretske’s [1995] taxonomy of representations 
In Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s Generative Theory of Tonal Music (GTTM in 
short) – one of the most popular cognitive theories of music – the term 'representations' 
is used without particular specification about their nature (syntactic and not semantic, 
with non-conceptual content): “We have restricted ourselves to a formal 
characterization of the listener's intuitions about musical structure (that is, of his mental 
representation of music)” [Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983, p. 332]. 
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In many cognitive theories of music, mental representations of music are 
considered to be implicitly construed by the mind according to the perception of 
musical flow, as tacit – or implicit – knowledge. By contrast, in GTTM the mental 
representations of music are considered in the framework of a final-state theory, and the 
authors are not committed to explain musical cognition as a real-time process: “Our 
approach to music theory has not been concerned with questions of memory capacity, 
real-time processing, brain localization, and the like” [Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983, 
p. 42]. The symbolic representations of GTTM are alleged to represent the static mental 
representation of a piece of music (that is a kind of natural and spontaneous musical 
analysis made by the mind). So the standard musical notation plus the binary branching 
trees notation (Figure 2) would represent a graphic analogon of mental representations 
of music. 
 
FIGURE 2. Time-span reduction of the opening of Mozart, K. 331, as an example 
of the representational structures of GTTM [from Jackendoff 1987] 
[Reprinted with the kind permission of MIT Press] 
Lerdahl [2001] expanded the theory (allegedly) eliminating all qualitative points, 
thus obtaining a first series of algorithms for tonal tension/attraction in the pitch space, 
which have been also experimentally tested [Lerdahl & Krumhansl, 2007], and which 
resembles in some aspects Huron’s theory of the mental representation of musical 
expectation [Huron, 2006]. Of course, GTTM has to assume that symbolic 
representation of music have a content analogous to that of mental representation of 
music. But according to DeBellis, GTTM “representations” of music are not true 
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representations insofar they do not have – as true representations have – truth conditions 
[DeBellis 1995, p. 21]. 
3. ON JACKENDOFF'S NOTION OF “MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS” 
DeBellis critical point of view falls in the philosophical side of the opposition that 
Jackendoff [1992] calls (evoking a Kuhnian “paradigm split”) the Philosophical Version 
of the theory of mind: “What is the relationship of the mind to the world, such that we 
can have knowledge of reality, such that we can have beliefs and desires about things in 
the world, and such that our sentences can be true or false?” [Jackendoff, 1992, p. 158]. 
But according to Jackendoff the philosophical position does not fit the scientific 
standard of cognitive science, and thus he strongly prefers the Psychological Version of 
the philosophy of mind: “How does the brain function as a physical device, such that 
the world seems to us the way it does, and such that we can behave effectively in the 
world?” [Jackendoff, 1992, ibidem]. This position derives from the Chomskyan notion 
of I-concepts (“internal concepts”) that allows science to inquire only on the already 
formed concepts and mental representations, without investigating their origin and 
referential connection with world. 
DeBellis burdens on Jackendoff alone the weight of his mentalistic position, 
according to which the problem of the right reference of representations to the world is 
not a problem for semanticists but for general psychology. Indeed, Jackendoff makes 
musical objects a kind of mental-dependent objects [Bullot & Égré, 2010]: “the 
constancy and reality of a piece of music are purely mental” [Jackendoff, 1992, p. 165]. 
Jackendoff criticizes the very notion of “mental representation” as it is normally used 
implying intentionality: “I am trying, therefore, to take the notion of representation as 
an entirely nonintentional notion. A representation is not necessarily about anything; if 
you like, it does not strictly speaking represent anything. (Hence my hesitation in using 
the term except as a rigid designator for what cognitive scientists believe the mind has 
in it.) The point of this notion of representation is that it can in principle be instantiated 
in a purely combinatorial device like the brain as I understand it, without resort to any 
miraculous biological powers of intentionality such as Searle [1980] wishes to ascribe 
to the brain” [Jackendoff 1992, p. 160]. He proposes also a possible alternative term for 
indicating the relational character of “mental representations” in his views: “If one 
wishes to reserve the term mental representation for brain-states-with-intentionality, I 
have no objection to introducing a new term, say mental distinctions, for the 
nonintentional states that I am calling mental representations here” [Jackendoff 1992, 
footnote 2, p. 182]. 
For Jackendoff, mental representations of music have definitely no truth value: “It 
hardly makes sense to say that the representations one constructs in response to hearing 
a performance of the Eroica are true or false. Nor does it make sense to claim one has 
propositional attitudes toward musical representations, which are not, as far as I can tell, 
propositions” [Jackendoff 1992, p. 165]. Jackendoff’s insistence on this point is even 
exaggerated, as he tries to use mental representations of music against philosophical 
positions à la Fodor which maintain that in mental representations what is essential is 
the semantic content: “the factors that make a piece of music cohere for a listener into 
something beyond a mere sequence of notes involve complex internal computations 
over abstract mental representations of the piece. Fodor's insistence on respecting 
semantic relations seems out of place here: “these abstract structures are part of mental 
life, but one would hardly want to make a metaphysical claim about there being 
something "real" in the world, propositional or otherwise, that they are representations 
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of” [Jackendoff 1992, pp. 29-30]. Here the question became puzzling: we can easily 
allow that musical structures are not out there in the world; but what about sound 
objects at the basis of musical structures? It seems very implausible that sound objects 
are not intentional object [Bullot & Égré, 2010]. The position of Jackendoff is very 
close to that of Dennett [1987] who “describes this situation in terms of the brain being 
a syntactic engine that mimics a semantic engine: by virtue of its evolutionary history, it 
acts for the most part as though it is making genuine contact with properties of the 
physical world” [Jackendoff 1992, p. 182]. This account is perhaps critical in the case of 
the semantic properties of the language, but for the case of music it is quite acceptable, 
as the only direct match of the musical faculty with a peripheral mental module is 
plausibly that with the body representation (at work in the case of the dance3). So in 
Jackendoff’s view, the notion of mental representations has to be considered as purely 
syntactic-combinatorial, and this account seems compatible with the recent and 
important reinterpretation of GTTM made by [Katz & Pesetsky, 2009], according to 
which music and language are structurally identical except for the nature of the 
compositional blocks of the two mental devices: concepts in the case of language, and 
sounds in the case of music. 
4. REPRESENTATION OF THE EXPECTATIONS 
The now well-known concept of “expectation” was introduced in musicology by 
Leonard B. Meyer [1956]: a sound event causes certain kinds of expectations of other 
sound events, and the satisfaction or the delusion of the expectancy is commonly 
considered as “a generator of musical affect” [Margulis, 2005, p. 663]. More recently, 
Huron [2006] sketches a complete theory of psychological expectations, starting from 
Meyer’s seminal study. To expect something is to mentally represent something as 
coming, so expectation is a kind of mental representation: “These expectations can be 
satisfied or not; it is this that makes them representational” [Luntley, 2003, p. 414]. Of 
course, here the framework is sensibly different from that of the classical cognitive 
sciences, which postulate a “static” kind of mental representations or an online 
construction of representation of music: the way is here opened to the embodied musical 
cognition [Leman, 2008]. 
Huron [2006] discusses the evolutionary origin of sound representations, starting 
from the specific example of the localization of sound in which three levels of 
perception are involved: unconscious (interaural time, amplitude differences, spectral 
shape), subconscious (horizontal azimuth of sounds, elevation or perception of their 
vertical position, and perception of distance), conscious (place, speed, trajectory). 
These kinds of mental representations of sounds are predictive of future events, so 
they implement the “where-next function”, a useful function both for survival and for 
the musical understanding. So, for Huron, the representation of sounds has a biological 
function allowing different forms of representation, as it is easily understood in the 
canonical case of pitch representation: there are no a priori reasons for a listener hearing 
                                                            
3
 “Searching for circumstantial leads, we observe that, among human activities, one that is closely related 
to music both in its structure and its affective response is dance. Dance is almost invariably performed to 
music, and its rhythmic characteristics parallel those of the music. Moreover, going beyond crude 
rhythmic correspondences, we have undeniable and detailed intuitions concerning whether the character 
of dance movements suit or fail to suit the music. Such intuitions are patently not the result of deliberate 
training, though they can be sharpened by training. This suggests that behind the control and appreciation 
of dance movements lies a cognitive structure that can be placed into a close correspondence with musical 
structure” [Jackendoff 1987, pp. 237-238]. 
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a (western tonal) music to expect the next sound event as an absolute pitch, or a 
particular pitch-class, or a contour, or an interval, or a scale degree, or a particular 
member of a specific chord, etc. The possibilities are many, and which is the right one is 
for Huron a difficult empirical question. This is a difficult question because there are no 
known methods for discriminating in which format the human mind processes the sound 
information. It is plausible in fact that “a profusion of different representations might be 
useful for a listening brain” [Huron, 2006, p. 107], at least if we agree, as Huron does, 
with Gerald Edelman's “neural Darwinism” [Edelman, 1987]. From this perspective “a 
good mental representation would be one that captures or approximates some useful 
organizational property of an animal’s actual environment” [Huron, 2006, p. 107]. The 
choice of the good format for a mental representation of sound is motivated from 
natural evolution, but how could the selection of the best mental representations work4? 
Here the concept of “expectation” is central, because a mental representation which is 
not adequate to the real world is more likely to cause wrong predictions. 
Huron hypothesizes four general principles, or preference rules5 for mental 
representation of pitch: (1) lower-order relationships, (2) neighboring over distant 
relationships (preferred for the same reason of 1), (3) lower-derivative states, (4) event-
related binding [Huron, 2006, p. 122]. Those types of relationships and cognitive 
objects are preferred because they are simpler to compute. In each case, these principles 
would be oriented by the preference for simplicity over complexity, as in a consolidated 
tradition of the evolutionary inspired cognitive science [Chater & Vitanyi, 2003]. The 
principles are generally understandable as a preference for event (or object) more than 
for relations: it is not that mind/brain cannot represent relationships, but “It is easier to 
process, code, or manipulate representations when they are mentally attached to events 
or objects” [Huron, 2006, p. 124]. 
From a neurological point of view, the four principles are the more plausible in 
terms of neural networks, because they favor the computational simplicity. These 
principles are compatible with neural Darwinism because they imply that initial mental 
representations of sounds are simple, low-order and free from contextual information. 
Finally, the expectations reveal to be “neural circuits whose activation depends on the 
pattern of sensory inputs” [Huron, 2006, p. 127]. 
5. INTENTIONAL SOUND OBJECTS 
The non-semantical content of a mental representation of musical sound is “a content 
that represents a sort of tension” [Luntley, 2003]: but is this content conceptual or non-
conceptual? The non-intentional character of mental representations à la Jackendoff 
raises a lot of problems not only for the cognitive psychologist who does not want to cut 
off with the real world, but also for the philosophical account of sound events as 
intentional objects. According to Bullot and Égré [2010] the sound objects are clearly 
intentionally related to the real world: “Regardless of the exact status of its targets, 
auditory experience may be characterized as intentional, in the sense that it is about that 
which is heard, or that which determines whether our demonstrative judgments based on 
                                                            
4 
Obviously it is not necessary to suppose that the selected representations are absolutely the best ones, 
but only the most adaptive in a particular context and at a particular moment: it is possible that other 
representational possibilities would abstractly be better than the ones selected, but for natural-historical 
reasons the evolution of our mind could have chosen the most contingently favorable and the least 
expensive solution, i.e., the most “relevant” in the sense of Sperber and Wilson [1986]. 
5 
The importance of preference rules for musical cognition is a central point in Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
[1983]. 
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auditory experience are true or false (their truth conditions). In accordance with the 
terminology inherited from Phenomenology, the contents of auditory experience can 
therefore be described in terms of ‘intentional objects’, in the broad sense of that which 
the state is about” [Bullot & Égré, 2010, p. 7]. 
Against Jackendoff's statement that mental representations of music are non-
intentional, the sound objects are defined as mental representations of the sounds in the 
world. If in the case of music the existence of higher level structures of the same kind as 
those postulated in GTTM is necessary to explaining musical cognition, in the case of 
non-musical sounds it seems possible to have a direct perception of the sound object. 
Huron's discussion of the complex cognitive process for localizing sounds in the space 
[Huron, 2006] is a good example of a “realistic” approach to the mental representations 
of sounds. It must be noted that the intentionality of the (mental representation of the) 
sound object does not need to be a conceptual intentionality, since, as observed by 
DeBellis [1995, 2005] and Luntey [2003], mental non-conceptual representations of 
music are very plausible: this kind of representations is very likely to cause behavior, 
but this behavior could not be rationally explained by the hearing subject. 
6. GÄRDENFORS'S CONCEPTUAL SPACES 
Ray Jackendoff sees in the cognitive science “the flavour of a paradigm split in the 
sense of Kuhn” [Jackendoff, 1992, p. 157], where two poles contend the fundamental 
framework: the “philosophical version” and the “psychological version”, although the 
distinction is an idealization of the divide. Here are some of the problems that were 
discussed from the philosophical point of view: the problem of the format of mental 
representations (symbolic vs connectionist); the syntax/semantics divergence; the 
question about the existence of non-conceptual contents; the disjunction problem. We 
have no room here to discussing all these problems but we can only hint some points. 
Concerning the symbolic/connectionist divide, Gärdenfors [2000] says that “[i]t 
has been a common prejudice in cognitive science that the brain is either a Turing 
machine working with symbols or a connectionist system using neural networks”. 
According to Gärdenfors, neither symbolic nor associationist-connectionist approach 
can completely explain and model the mechanism of concept acquisition, that needs a 
formalization of similarity (recall Chomsky’s criticisms against the behavioristic notion 
of “similar stimuli” [Chomsky, 1967]). According to Gärdenfors, the solution is a third 
form of representing information, based on geometrical structures. Gärdenfors 
elaborated a theory of conceptual spaces in which concepts are considered as 
multidimensional domains with a multiplicity of quality dimensions. The conceptual 
level of cognition is the second level of Marr’s [1982] famous three levels of cognition, 
the level of “Representation and algorithm” between the symbolic (Computational) and 
the connectionist one (for Marr, that of Implementation). A conceptual space consists of 
a number of quality dimensions, where common examples of dimensions are 
“temperature, weight, brightness, pitch and the three ordinary spatial dimensions height, 
width and depth”. 
But, if musical pitch were represented in a conceptual space, what about the 
relations between pitches and other musical dimensions that constitute musical relations 
and objects? Also the sub-musical (sound object) level is a matter of mental 
representation. Sound objects are intentional objects [Bullot & Egré, 2010], so they are 
mental representations of the sounds of the world: that is plausibly the evolutionary 
function of audition. Following Gärdenfors we hypothesize that the representation of 
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the sound object should be at the subsymbolic level and the representation of musical 
object is at the symbolic level, that of Marr's “representations”. Sound perception 
cannot be identified with music perception. 
In order to explain the relation between sound object and musical object, we have 
to consider a particular notion of supervenience. The status of the “musical object” has 
to be of higher level than sound object. The musical object supervenes on (i.e., depends 
on/covaries with/is irreducible to) the sound object, and this supervenience should pass 
through the conceptual level of mental representations. 
7. ALGEBRAIC FORMALIZATIONS AND GEOMETRICAL REPRESENTATIONS 
OF MUSIC 
As shown in the previous sections, the notion of mental representations within the field 
of cognitive musicology remains ambiguous and vague. Nevertheless, as pointed out by 
Huron [2006], there is a plurality of representations of music proposed by music 
theorists during the twentieth century, even if many of these representations seem to be 
theoretical constructions which are quite artificial and without a great link with the 
experience of listening. Our aim is to try to detect a theoretical and experimental 
intersection for different kinds of representations of music, with different degree of 
mental reality and theoretical utility. 
From the perspective of computational musicology, the concept of 
“representation” has deeply been connected with that of formalization, by often 
revealing different modalities of articulation between the two notions. If a mathematical 
representation of musical structure seems to anticipate the formalization process, in the 
case of algebraic methods applied to music, as it has been largely discussed in 
[Andreatta, 2003], one can see the representation act as crucially following the 
formalization process. As a paradigmatic example of this interplay, one can consider the 
two traditional geometric representations of musical structures, commonly used in the 
neo-Riemannian analytical tradition, i.e. the circular and the toroidal representations. 
In order to understand the relationships between these two apparently very 
different representations, one simply has to notice that both directly derive from the 
formalization of a given equal tempered system with the algebraic structure of a finite 
(cyclic) group. The octave reduction enables first to reduce the combinatorial space of 
the division of the octave into n equal parts to the algebraic structure of cyclic groups of 
order n and, successively, to the toroidal representation via the Sylow decomposition of 
an Abelian group as a product of maximal p-groups, which directly offers an 
isomorphism between the circular representation and the toroidal space, commonly 
referred to as Tonnetz (see Figure 3). 
The Tonnetz provides a geometrical conceptual space in the sense of Gärdenfors, 
enabling to represent musical processes as paths within this space. This opens very 
interesting questions concerning the possibility of automatically “generating” the 
musical space via new paradigms in computer-science (such as the spatial computing 
paradigm), according to the local logical dimension which is present in a given musical 
passage.6 Interestingly, spatial computing can also open new perspectives in order to 
grasp the algebraic/geometric character of the so-called “transformational” paradigm in 
music analysis which generalizes at the same time the set-theoretical and the neo-
                                                            
6
 See Bigo et al. [2011]. For a different description of Gärdenfors’s theory of conceptual spaces with 
respect to concept formations in Musical Creative Systems, see Forth et al. [2010]. 
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Riemannian approaches. In fact, from an algebraic perspective, the traditional set-
theoretical approach in music analysis is based on the hypothesis of using a given 
established catalogue of musical structures (chords, motifs, rhythms) as orbits under the 
action of one particular group, i.e. the dihedral group. But there are several possibilities 
to obtain different musically pertinent catalogues of orbits under the action of given 
finite groups (see Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 3. The interplay between the algebraic formalization and the geometric 
representation underlying the isomorphism between the cyclic group and the Tonnetz.  
Via the octave reduction, the combinatorial space of the piano is reduced to the algebraic structure of 
cyclic groups of order n and, successively, to the toroidal representation via the Sylow decomposition of 
Z/12Z as a product of Z/3Z et Z/4Z, which directly offers an isomorphism between the circular 
representation and the Tonnetz, which corresponds geometrically to a toroidal structure. 
On the contrary, transformational analysis implies a double movement. On one 
side, one aims at constructing an abstract configuration of musical objects (called 
“transformational network”), and on the other side this formal architecture has to be 
utilized in order to help either the perception of the musical form or the interpretation of 
(a passage of a) given musical piece.7 In other words, the interest of constructing a 
spatial network of musical structures lies on the possibility of using it for “structuring” 
the listening process or “guiding” the performance of the piece. The construction of a 
transformational network is based, in fact, on the implicit attempt by the analyst to 
make the underlying musical logic “intelligible” to the listener and/or to the performer. 
This logic has a geometric character, and for this reason, it seems crucial to us, in the 
case of a transformational analysis, to always couple the underlying geometrical 
representation with a computational model, which can been integrated in different 
environments for computer-aided music analysis. Before analyzing some new 
theoretical implications of this approach for a mathematically-oriented experimental 
psychology, as well as for a structural perspective on cognitive processes, we will show 
                                                            
7
 This double movement is wonderfully captured by the title of David Lewin’s essay providing one of the 
most interesting case study for a perceptual validation of the transformational paradigm (“Making and 
Using a Pcset Network for Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III”.) See Lewin [1993]. 
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in more detail what a transformational analysis becomes whence it is approached from a 
computational perspective. 
 
FIGURE 4. The paradigmatic architecture showing that the set-theoretical approach is but 
a special case of the action of a group (the dihedral group of order 24 generated by 
musical transpositions and inversions) on the collection of subsets of the equal tempered 
system. 
This action enables to algebraically formalize Allen Forte’s catalogue of pitch-class sets as described, for 
example, in Forte [1973]. The figure shows four other historically musically pertinent catalogues of 
musical structures, obtained as orbits under the action of given finite groups (cyclic, affine and symmetric 
groups). They correspond respectively to the catalogue of 352 transposition classes of chords (obtained, 
independently, by Maciej Zalewki, Anatol Vieru, George D. Halsey and Edwin Hewitt), the catalogue of 
158 affine classes (obtained by Robert Morris and Guerino Mazzola) and, finally, the catalogue of 77 
textures by the Mexican composer Julio Estrada. This architecture has been integrated into OpenMusic, a 
visual programming language used for computer-aided music theory, analysis and composition. 
8. SOME COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS 
In his celebrated analysis of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III, the American music-
theorist David Lewin distinguished two radically different strategies revealing the logics 
underlying this short piece. Both approaches rely on the hypothesis that there exists a 
“generating” structure for the piece, more precisely a pentachord (i.e. a collection of 
five different pitches) which covers all the note-events contained in the score through 
two main musical transformations: transpositions (i.e. adding a given number of 
semitones to every element of the chord) and inversions (i.e. reversing the order of 
intervals contained in the chord). They geometrically correspond respectively to 
rotations of a polygon inscribed in the circle and to their reflections, according to a 
symmetry axis which keeps invariant the chromatic tetrachord included in the basic 
pentachord. The inversion is therefore always defined “contextually”, i.e. as the 
symmetry fixing a given subset of the chord and moving the single note not belonging 
to the chromatic tetrachord.8 According to the underlying algebraic structure provided 
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The reason for choosing this “contextual” inversion is primarily motivated by the perceptual relevance 
of this musical transformation, as Lewin observes.  It would be interesting to discuss the “contextual” 
character of most of the algebraic tools developed within the transformational paradigm with respect to 
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by the dihedral group, transpositions and inversions can be combined by generating, in 
such a way, new symmetries (see Figure 5). 
 
FIGURE 5. Inversions and transpositions as geometric operations within the circular 
representation. 
A pentachord (i.e. chord containing five notes) is initially inverted with respect to a symmetry axis 
leaving invariant a subset (corresponding, musically speaking, to a chromatic tetrachord) and then 
transposed. 
In the first approach, musical transformations, once algebraically formalized and 
geometrically represented, are organized in an order which reflects the temporal 
unfolding of the piece. This “chronological” vision of the pentachords organization is 
called “transformational progression” but it is not the only possibility of associating a 
geometric conceptual space to a given musical piece. In a second, and more abstract, 
approach, transformations build a relational network within which it is possible to 
define a variety of different paths. In this case the linear notion of transformational 
progression is supplanted by the spatial concept of “transformational network”. A 
transformational analysis can be conceived as a dialectical process between 
transformational progressions and transformational networks, without imposing any 
predominance to one of the two analytic strategies. The interest is, on the contrary, to 
assign to these two “ontologically” different strategies different weights within the 
analytical activity. Figure 6 shows the first measures of the piece with the beginning of 
the segmentation process, as proposed by Lewin. Note that this segmentation is very 
different, in nature, from all the segmentations proposed by Lerdahl and Jackendoff in 
their GTTM, where segments never have elements in common. Lewin’s segmentation 
by “imbrication”, on the contrary, explicitly lies on the hypothesis that, from an 
analytical and perceptual point of view, segments without common notes are less 
interesting than regions sharing one or more elements. This simple fact clearly shows 
the spatial character of the transformational approach, compared to the “sequential” 
nature of the analytical engine of GTTM. 
The segmentation is obtained by considering different instances, or 
transformations, of the initial pentachord. All these transformations do not affect the 
“set-theoretical” nature of the base musical structure, since all the forms are equivalent 
(up to a transposition or an inversion). Because of the fact that the segmentation directly 
follows the temporal organization of the musical piece, we are clearly dealing with a 
“transformational progression”. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
similar notions in cognitive science, particularly in Dreyfus’s phenomenology-oriented critique of AI 
[Dreyfus & Hall, 1982]. See Andler [2000; 2006] for a detailed analysis of the relationships between 
Dreyfus’s position with respect to phenomenology, cognitive sciences and the problem of context. For a 
recent account of Dreyfus’s influence on Lewin’s transformational constructions, see Kane [2011], 
Andreatta and Petitot [2012]. 
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A different strategy consists of considering the transformations as possible ways 
of structuring the abstract space of pentachordal forms. The “transformational 
progression” becomes a specific path within this more abstract relational space. The 
collection of formal relationships between different instances of the base pentachord 
constitutes a space of potentialities within which the piece moves. One of the main 
differences, with respect to the transformational progression, is that the organization of 
pentachordal forms within a network has no direct link with their chronological arrival.  
 
FIGURE 6. First measures of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III with a beginning of 
segmentation process by imbrication. 
The segments, or regions, are described with the help of the circular representation and accompanied by 
the indication of the main three set-theoretical invariants, i.e. SI (intervallic structure, counting the 
intervallic distance between two consecutive notes), IFUNC (Lewin’s Intervallic function, counting the 
multiplicity of occurrence of each interval, from the unison to the major seventh, within the chord) and VI 
(Forte’s Interval Vector; counting the multiplicity of occurrence of each interval, from the unison to the 
triton, within the chord). 
The following Figure (see Figure 7) represents the transformational network of 
the Klavierstück III in the analysis by Lewin, which we show by adding the circular 
representation in order to make the structural relations between the different 
pentachords more evident. 
The notation for the pentachordal forms and the transformations are borrowed 
from Lewin’s ones. Hence, the transposition of the pentachord P by n semitones, 
corresponding to the transformation Tn(P), is written as Pn. The same notation is used 
for the transpositions of the symmetric pentachord p. The transformations P6 and p6 
correspond, for example, respectively to the triton transposition of the pentachord P and 
of its symmetric p = J0(P). Note that all axial symmetries Jn which fix the chromatic 
tetrachord contained in P or p can be formally expressed as a transposition Tn of the 
basic J0 inversion (which transforms P into p). For example J6 indicates the composition 
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of the J0 symmetry with the T6 triton transposition. One finds in this way the basic 
axiom of the transformational approach, i.e. the possibility of replacing the concept of 
interval in a given GIS (Generalized Interval System)9 with the (generalized) 
transposition operation. Moreover, as the Figure 7 clearly shows, within the 
corresponding transformational network it is possible to find regions having the same 
arrow configurations. This enables to establish a 1-to-1 correspondence between regions 
of the network, the so-called “strong isographic relation”, and to explicitly compute the 
number of strong isographies associated with a given transformational network.10 We 
analyze in the next two sections the consequences of this change of perspective with 
respect of the notion of mental representation and, more generally, the epistemological 
and philosophical implications of this transformational paradigm in music analysis. 
 
FIGURE 7. Transformational network of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III (after the 
analysis by David Lewin). 
The network generates a conceptual relational space, where the different pentachords, which are 
geometrically represented by means of the circular representation, are related by transpositions or 
inversions. 
9. TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS AND MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
We strongly believe that the fact of coupling an algebraically formalized geometrical 
approach, such as the transformational one, with a computational perspective has some 
crucial theoretical implications for cognitive sciences and mathematical psychology. 
                                                            
9 
We cannot enter, unfortunately, in the mathematical aspects of the GIS structure. Intuitively, a GIS is a 
set (which Lewin interestingly calls a “space”) and a group of intervals acting on the space in a simply 
transitive way. See Andreatta [2012] for a formal definition of a generalized system within a more general 
philosophical discussion on the American music-theoretical tradition. 
10
 By using category theory one can elegantly compute this number after formalizing strong isographies 
as a special type of limit within the functorial theory of denotators developed by Mazzola [2002]. See 
Mazzola and Andreatta [2006] for the first attempt at formalizing transformational theory in a categorical 
way. 
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One simple way to have the intuition of this change is to compare the transformational 
approach in music analysis with some mathematically-oriented directions in 
developmental psychology and cognition, such as Halford and Wilson’s 
neostructuralistic approach [Halford and Wilson, 1980], Macnamara’s and Reyes’s 
logical foundation of cognitive sciences [Macnamara and Reyes, 1994], Ehresmann and 
Vanbremeersch’s Memory Evolutive System Model [Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch, 
2007] and Phillips and Wilson’s Categorical Compositionality [Phillips and Wilson, 
2010]. From an epistemological point of view, transformational analysis provides an 
instantiation, in the music domain, of Gilles-Gaston Granger’s articulation between the 
“objectal” and the “operational” dimensions [Granger, 2004]. This duality was 
considered by the French epistemologist as the foundational basis for the very notion of 
“concept” in philosophy.11 From the perspective of developmental psychology, among 
the three problematics which – according to the psychologist Olivier Houdé – mark the 
renewal of Piaget’s genetic epistemology, category theory occupies a central place 
[Houdé, 1993]. Differently from the structural approach which Piaget developed 
starting from his Essai de logistique opératoire (1949) and which also constitutes the 
conceptual framework of his researches on the “abstraction réfléchissante”, category 
theory introduces, according to Houdé, a new element in the operational thinking. 
Morphisms enable to take into account an “aspect of logical-mathematical cognition 
which does not proceed from the transformation of the reality (operations and grouping 
of operations) but which takes into account the simple relational activity [mise en 
relation]”.12 
This interpretation of the categorical approach explains, we think, a fundamental 
aspect of transformational analysis, which is the interplay between the notion of 
transformational progression and that of transformational network that we have 
described in the case of Lewin’s analysis of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III. In a 
progression, transformations follow according to an order which respects the 
chronological unfolding of the piece. The operational logic remains anchored to a 
temporal component which, as in the case of the piece by Stockhausen, does not seem to 
capture the underlying musical logic as it is perceived by the listener. The main point is 
that in a transformational network the “operational logic” is created by the analyst by 
means of putting in relation objects with morphisms in an abstract space of 
potentialities. As stated by Lewin, the transformational network “shows a certain 
abstractly structured space of possibilities through which the piece moves, but it also 
shows how the abstract structuring is suggested and bounded by actual transitions 
within the progress of the piece itself” (Lewin 1993, p. 36). By paraphrasing Lewin’s 
conclusion, in the case of transformational progressions we are at a given time of the 
narrative process of the piece, whereas in the case of an abstract network we are instead 
in one well defined point within the space created by the piece.  
The question which remains open is the real “perceptibility”13 of the relational 
conceptual space associated to a given musical piece, independently of the special case 
of the pentachordal transformational network underlying Stockhausen’s 
Klavierstück III. 
                                                            
11 See, in particular, the article “Contenus formels et dualité”, reprinted in Granger [1994]. 
12 See Houdé [1993]. 
13 An ongoing project between the Musical Representation Team at Ircam and a research group of the 
Schulich School of Music at the McGill University, directed by Stephen McAdams, is currently 
evaluating the perceptual relevance of Lewinian analysis of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III. 
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10. TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STRUCTURALISM IN 
“MATHEMUSICAL” REPRESENTATIONS. 
It is probably too early to evaluate the epistemological consequences of a “paradigmatic 
change” in music analysis, as the transformational approach has been characterized in 
comparison to the previous approaches in music theory and analysis. Nevertheless, we 
can easily describe some potential interesting future research directions. Concerning the 
very nature of “space” in music, apart from the spatial programming paradigm, which 
has – as we have suggested – interesting applications in music, there are some intriguing 
connections between transformational analysis and Husserlian phenomenology, in 
particular in its relationships with mathematical idealities and physical reality.14 Many 
questions raised by Luciano Boi in the presentation of the first part of Rediscovering 
Phenomenology [Boi et al., 2007] focused on spatiality and phenomenology of 
perception, exceed the case of visual perception. In particular, in the case of the spatial 
organization of musical structures proposed by the transformational approach, the 
question arises concerning the relation between perceived forms and cognitive activity. 
This relation equally asks for an analysis of the local/global articulation within a given 
transformational network. We can establish, in this way, a very surprising connection 
between transformational analysis and the category-oriented model of the Memory 
Evolutive System by Ehresmann and Vanbreemersch.15 This model offers an interesting 
example for approaching the complex hierarchical nature of human cognition from a 
categorical perspective by also taking its compositionality character into account. As 
somehow emphatically stressed by Steven Phillips and William H. Wilson, “Category 
theory offers a re-conceptualization for cognitive science, analogous to the one that 
Copernicus provided for astronomy, where representational states are no longer the 
center of the cognitive universe – replaced by the relationships between the maps which 
transform them” [Phillips & Wilson 2010, p. 1]. 
Music, and more precisely mathemusical research, represents a way of finding a 
conciliation between structuralistic tradition and Husserlian phenomenology, two 
approaches which are usually considered as antagonistic.16 We have therefore proposed 
the term “phenomenological structuralism” for such a philosophical orientation in 
mathematical music theory and computational musicology.17 One can propose this 
hypothesis starting, for example, from the writing by Ernst Cassirer [1944], whose 
algebraic considerations on the melody are directly inspired by Felix Klein Program in 
geometry [Klein, 1872] and whose thinking is also largely influenced by Husserlian 
phenomenology [Choi, 2009]. 
A philosophical discussion which seems to find a natural application to the field 
of transformational analysis is proposed by Jocelyn Benoist in the chapter of the already 
quoted Rediscovering phenomenology book [2007] on the phenomenological relevance 
of category theory. In fact, if one of the aspects characterizing the phenomenological 
approach is the attention toward the dynamics of conceptual intuition, the way in which 
                                                            
14 
See L. Boi et al. [2007]. 
15
 The first musical applications of the model of Memory Evolutive Systems were presented and 
discussed during several sessions of the 11th season of the MaMuX Seminar at Ircam. The topic 
constitutes the object of the ongoing PhD thesis by J. Mandereau (University of Pisa/University Paris VI). 
16
 In doing that, we have been crucially influenced by Jean Petitot’s approach aiming at rediscovering the 
deep connections between structuralism and phenomenology. See, in particular, Petitot [1988, 1994, 
1999, 2009]. 
17
 See Andreatta [2012]. The same concept was used by Jean Petitot, although in a different context, with 
reference to Jakobson approach in structural linguistics. This aspect was discussed in details by Petitot in 
his morphological reading of the genealogy of structuralism [Petitot, 1999]. 
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David Lewin stresses the construction process within a transformational analysis – as 
exemplified in Lewin [1993] – suggests the possibility of coexistence of a 
phenomenological approach and a structural investigation in the domain of 
mathematical representation in music. In the same way as “Husserlian phenomenology 
of mathematics is structural, since it fixes itself on the invariants […] of which it makes 
the heart of the mathematical objectity [objectité mathématique] as formal objectity”18, 
transformational analysis is phenomenological by being at the same time structural, 
since the group of transformations acting on the musical space is systematically 
confronted to the perceptive process which is peculiar to the subjectivity of the analyst. 
Starting from reflections of mathematicians on the phenomenological account of 
contemporary mathematics, and comparing these authors with other more 
epistemological orientations on the cognitive aspects of the phenomenological method, 
researchers in mathematical music theory, computational musicology and music 
informatics might find the way to constitute a new conceptual space within which some 
mathematical problems raised by music do have important perceptual implications and 
open perspectives enabling to enrich and renew the philosophical quest. This would 
surely lead to a better understanding of the geometric character underlying the complex 
notion of mental representation. 
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